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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The days from January 29 to March 31, 1968, mark the Tet
Offensive, the most significant period of time in the
American war in Vietnam.

It will be one purpose of this

paper to explain this great irony:

what was a military

victory for the American forces should have signaled to
American leaders that the war in Vietnam was unwinnable.
Another purpose of this paper will be to demonstrate that,
because the war was not winnable at a price America was
willing to pay, and because our leaders could reasonably have
been expected to understand this after the Tet offensive, all
American forces should have been immediately withdrawn from
Vietnam at that time.

Our failure to immediately withdraw

after Tet cost the American and Vietnamese people another
five years of war, and did nothing to alter the final outcome
of the struggle.
It is clear that, looking back in 1990, our war in
Vietnam did not achieve its objective:
from Communist aggression.

saving South Vietnam

What this thesis will attempt to

argue is that among several alternative courses of action,
the course of action America chose caused more harm, death,
and unhappiness than other alternatives would have caused.

1

This thesis will argue that the war in its entirety was
morally wrong because it simply did more harm than good to
both Vietnam and America.
However, I will argue that this result was not easily
foreseen by a rational American government in 1964, on the
basis of the evidence available to it.

Therefore, while I

will argue that the war in its entirety was immoral, I will
also argue that from the our perspective in 1964 the decision
to wage war was at least rational.

I will define a rational

decision as a decision which, on the basis of the available
evidence, can be reasonably expected to produce the best
consequences.
The crux of my argument, however, is that after the Tet
Offensive, it ought to have been clear to a rational American
government that the objectives it sought could not be
achieved.

It should have been apparent that more war would

only bring more pain and death to Vietnam and America.
Therefore, on the basis of the available evidence in 1968,
the only morally correct decision would have been to withdraw
immediately.
To summarize the objectives of this thesis, I wish to
show that our entire war in Vietnam was immoral.

I also wish

to show that in 1964, our decision to wage war could be said
to be rational, but that by 1968, our decision to continue to
wage war was clearly irrational.
The theoretical framework of this paper will be
explicitly utilitarian.

The utilitarian must not simply
2

evaluate the actual consequences of an historical act when
evaluating its morality.
philosophical story.

To do so is to get only half of the

To get the other half, the philosopher

must evaluate the action from the perspective of an agent
seeking to perform that act which, given the available
evidence, was the act which could have been reasonably
expected to have the best consequences.

In this paper, I

will seek to uncover both halves of the moral dilemma that
was our war in Vietnam.
To do so, I will first need to explain and defend the
utilitarian moral framework within which I will place the
American war in Vietnam.

In the first chapter of this thesis

I will do so, paying special attention to J.J.C. Smart's
distinction between that which is 'rational' and that which
is 'morally right'.

His distinction plays an important role

in this paper.
In the second chapter of this thesis.the real objectives
of this paper, which were introduced above, will be fully
developed.

3

CHAPTER 2
UTILITARIANISM AND A THEORY OF JUST WAR

Traditionally, ethical theories have been classified as
either teleological or deontological.

Teleological theories

hold that it is solely the consequences of a given action
which determine its moral rightness or wrongness.
Deontological theories argue that the rightness or wrongness
of an action can be determined by understanding factors other
than the consequences of the action, such as the nature of
the act itself, or the motive of the agent.

Utilitarianism

as it is usually understood is a teleological ethical theory
wherein the consequences of an action are evaluated as to
whether or not they tend to maximize happiness.
Perhaps the best known formulation of the utilitarian
principle is Mill's essay, Utilitarianism.

Mill saw a need

for a first principle of ethics, a standard by which an act
might be judged to be morally right or wrong.

The standard

he found was utility.
"The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals
'utility' or the 'greatest happiness principle' holds that
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote
happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness.

By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence
4

of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of
pleasure. "1
Implicit in hedonistic utilitarian theory is the idea
that the good, happiness, and pleasure are equivalent.

I

will assume a quantitative, hedonistic form of act
utilitarianism for the purposes of this thesis.

It will

hopefully become clear, as I explain the specific features of
my theory of just war, that the central arguments of this
thesis will work within the framework of any plausible theory
of value.
For the quantitative hedonistic act-utilitarian the good
and happiness (as pleasure) are one.

According to Thomas

Hearn, "Utilitarianism is the teleological theory which
asserts that of the possible acts in a given situation one
should perform the one which will bring about the most good
for the most number of people."2

According to Mill, it is

the sum total of happiness that the utilitarian ought to seek
to maximize.

"The utilitarian standard is .•• the greatest

amount of happiness altogether."3

In a general sense, then,

I will assume that actions that maximize happiness maximize
the good.
Those who sacrifice their own pleasure for the sak• of
others (martyrs, for instance) do so because they increase
the total amount of happiness in the world.

Mill's

utilitarianism recognizes the power of humans to sacrifice
their own good for the benefit of others, and recognizes acts
of sacrifice as morally right if and only if they increase
5

the amount of happiness in the world.4

It might be clearer,

then, if we amend Hearn's statement to say,

'One should

perform the act which will bring about the greatest net total
of happiness.'

Mill explained that it is not simply the

agent's own happiness the utilitarian must seek.

The

utilitarian must be a disinterested agent, in that he must
act so that the greatest amount of happiness is achieved by a
particular act.

If that means that the agent, or another

individual, must suffer for the greatest amount of happiness
to be achieved, so be it.

The utilitarian has no choice but

to perform the action which produces the greatest sum total
of happiness.
A difficult question presents itself to the utilitarian.
What, exactly, does it mean to be happy?
of the happiness a utilitarian seeks?

What is the nature

No philosopher has

ever given a conclusive answer to that question.

However,

different forms of utilitarianism have developed different
ideas of what it means to be happy.
J.J.C. Smart explained two forms of utilitarianism in
his essay, "An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics."
In general terms, it seems that happiness for the hedonistic
utilitarian is pleasure.

For the quantitative hedonistic

utilitarian, all forms of pleasure can make us equally happy.
All pleasures of equal quality or intensity are equally
valuable.

For the ideal utilitarian, however, some states of

mind, such as learning, are intrinsically valuable apart from
their pleasantness.

Viewing quality art, for instance, would
6

have greater value than a sensuous pleasure for the ideal
utilitarian . . For the hedonistic utilitarian, however, it is
simply the pleasure itself which makes us happy.

Happy

people, for this type of utilitarianism, have a favorabie
balance of pleasure and pain.

The amount of pleasure, its

intensity combined with its duration, is equal to the amount
of happiness received.5
Mill's unique sort of utilitarianism is difficult to
place within these definitions.

For Mill, certain forms of

pleasure are more valuable or desirable than others.

These

types of pleasures are more valuable for Mill simply because
they give us more happiness.

The pleasures Mill refers to as

the more valuable are those which are separate from the
'animal appetites'.

Animals are content to eat, sleep, and

reproduce; these activities give animals pleasure and
therefore give them a certain level of happiness~

Humans

need these pleasures, but if restricted to these animal
pleasures alone, we will not be truly happy.

We also need

the "pleasures of the intellect, of feelings and imagination,
and of moral sentiments" to be happy as human beings.6

Once

we experience these pleasures, we cannot simply be content in
the lower pleasures.

"Human beings have faculties more

elevated than the animal appetites and, when once made
conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which
does not include their gratification."7
Mill claims that those humans who have been exposed to
both the animal and the distinctly human types of pleasures
7

will indicate a preference for the latter.
the higher pleasures are more valuable.

For this reason

Once we have known

the higher pleasures, Mill argues, we cannot be truly happy
without them.

And, given a choice between the two, those who

have experienced both will choose the higher.8
It must be mentioned that, according to Smart's
definition, Mill is not an ideal utilitarian.

The higher

pleasures of the mind are valuable for Mill because they make
us happy.

According to Smart, the ideal utilitarian holds

that certain experiences are valuable apart from their
tendency to give us pleasure and happiness.

Mill, however,

does distinguish between the bodily pleasures and the mental
pleasures in that the latter are more desirable and valuable.
The quantitative hedonistic utilitarian will not admit that
different types of pleasures of equal intensity and duration
have different value.

It is this latter sort of

utilitarianism that I will assume for the.purposes of this
thesis.
Forms of happiness were not Mill's main concern,
however.

His main concern was that the end of all actions

which are morally right be happiness in general.

"The

ultimate end ••• is an existence exempt as far as possible
from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments."9
Just as utilitarians have different notions of what is
intrinsically valuable and ought to be maximized,
utilitarians also have different notions of how to evaluate
the consequences of actions.

An act utilitarian will wish to
8

evaluate only the specific consequences of a specific action
when determining that actions moral worth.

According to

J.J.C. Smart, act utilitarianism is, HThe view that the
rightness or wrongness of an action depends only on the total
goodness or badness of its consequences."10

In order to

evaluate an action under act utilitarian principles, one
simply evaluates whether or not the act has maximized
happiness.

If the act has maximized the amount of happiness

in the world, or minimized the pain, then that act was
morally right.

If the act resulted in less happiness, or

more pain, then the act was wrong.
Opposed to the view that the rightness of an action
depends of that action producing a state of maximum
happiness, rule utilitarianism states this:

the rightness or

wrongness of an action is to be judged by the goodness or
badness of the consequences of a rule that would require
everyone to perform a like action under like circumstances.
Rule utilitarianism is a restricted form of utilitarianism in
that under this theory, acts are judged not as to whether or
not they specifically promoted the greater good, but as to
whether or not they follow a rule which promotes the greatest
good.

It is clearly utilitarianism, though, because an act

must be performed only if, Huniform acc~ptance of a
corresponding rule would maximize expectable utility."11
Rule utilitarianism does not simply evaluate an action by
asking whether or not it conforms to a rule.

The act, under

rule utilitarianism, is not only right or wrong by virtue of
9

the rule it follows, but also by virtue of the utility of
everyone's conforming to that rule.
The distinction between rule and act utilitarianism
stated in general terms is this:

act utilitarianism

evaluates the consequences of specific actions, while rule
utilitarianism evaluates the consequences of everyone's
obeying a certain rule or set of rules.

If the general

welfare and happiness is to be promoted by the breaking of a
rule, then it is clear that under act utilitarian principles,
the rule ought to be broken.
It is an unfortunate consequence of act utilitarianism
that it seems to work best in hindsight.

After an act has

been done, one can evaluate its consequences and decide on
its rightness or wrongness.

However, a utilitarian must

often make a decision on which act to choose from among the
available alternatives in order to maximize future happiness.
It seems clear that as utilitarians, we ought to choose that
action which seems likely, given the available evidence, to
secure the greatest expectable sum total of happines~.
We cannot predict future consequences of actions with
complete certainty, but we can attempt to understand the
situation as we would reasonably expect it to unfold, given
the evidence, if various alternative actions were done.

The

utilitarian simply chooses that action which can be
reasonably expected at the time to be most likely to maximize
utility.

That which is maximized is expected utility.

The

expected utility of an action is the amount of good an action
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can reasonably be expected to produce, given the available
evidence.

According to J.J.C. Smart, "All we can do is to

assign various probabilities to the various possible effects

of an action."12
It is quite possible for an action to seem morally good
according to utilitarian principles before the action is
done, but later to be proven wrong according to the same
utilitarian principles.

This is inevitable, given the fact

that humans cannot foresee the future.

Smart recommends that

we use the term "rational" to describe an action which, on
the available evidence, seems likely to maximize happiness.
He also recommends that we use the term "right" to describe
an action which truly does maximize happiness.13
It seems to me that this distinction is important when
evaluating historical events.

The utilitarian must not

simply evaluate the real consequences of the historical act
(as far as they can be determined) when evaluating its
morality.

I believe that to do so is to get only half of the

philosophical story.

To get the other half, the philosopher

must evaluate the action from the perspective of the agent
facing several alternatives.
At this point it will be necessary to make a
terminological distinction.

Looking backwards at an action,

one can determine its real consequences.

From our

perspective in 1990, we can look back on America's years in
Vietnam and get a reasonably clear picture of the real
consequences of our actions in that country during those
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years.

By evaluating these consequences, we can determine

the real utility of our actions in Vietnam.

However, in the

year 1964, it was only possible to make an educated
approximation about the consequences of our future actions.
Faced with a set of alternative actions, and a set of
probable consequences corresponding to those actions, America
was forced to choose.

In 1964, America chose the course of

action which seemed most likely to have the best probable
consequences, and therefore have the greatest expected
utility.

On utilitarian grounds, given the fact that an

agent reasonably expects on the basis of the available
evidence that a certain action will give the best
consequences, the agent ought to perform that act.

"If doing

'A' has, among all the things 'X' can do, the maximum net
expectable utility, then it is 'X's' duty to do 'A'."14
The expected utility of an action differs, then, from
the real utility of an action by virtue of the perspective
from which the act is viewed.

Real utility can be determined

by looking backwards at the real action and its real
consequences.

Expected utility can only be determined by

examining, on the basis of all available evidence, what the
probable consequences of a given action among a set of
alternative actions will be.
Unfortunately, it must be admitted that we only know the
actual consequences of one alternative action in any given
historical situation.

We can make educated guesses at what

the actual consequences of other alternatives might have
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been.

These guesses, however educated, do remain at the

level of informed conjecture.

We will never know what the

actual consequences of not supporting South Vietnam
militarily might have been, but we are in a position to make
an informed guess as to what the actual consequences would
have been.

This difficulty is not just a problem for my

thesis, though.

It is a methodological difficulty for anyone

who makes moral judgements regarding historical events.
At the start of this Chapter I noted that ethical
theories have traditionally been defined as either
teleological or deontological.

To repeat, teleological

theories hold that it is solely the consequences of a given
action which determine its moral rightness or wrongness.
Deontological theories argue that the rightness or wrongness
of an action can be determined by understanding factors other
than consequences, such as the nature of the act itself, or
the motives of the agent.

W.D. Ross, in The Ri1ht and the

Good, has developed a deontological moral system which might
be seen as challenging the utilitarian morality.

It is not

my intention in this paper to exhaustively examine Ross's
theory of what makes an act right or wrong.

Nor is it my

intention to show conclusively that utilitarianism is a
better moral theory.

What I will attempt to do is to point

out what, from the utilitarian perspective, are two important
weaknesses in Ross's moral system.
Ross's system centers on his list of Prima Facie moral
duties.

These duties are guidelines we must consult befo~e
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we make a moral judgement,

A Prima Facie duty is a duty

which, all things being equal, we have an obligation to
uphold in action.

For Ross, one who acts rightly does so

without ultimate regard for the total consequences of the
act, but simply because he recognizes a duty, an obligation,
to do the right thing.

"When a man fulfills a promise

because he thinks he ought to do so, it seems clear that he
does so with no thought of its total consequences •..

What

makes him think it right to act in a certain way is the fact

that he has promised to do so,"15

This situation, for Ross,

has moral relevance in that making a promise obligates one to
keep that promise.

All things being equal, one has a moral

duty to uphold the Prima Facie duties in action.

For Ross,

it is self-evident that in circumstances where one of these
duties clearly applies and there are no conflicting duties of
greater moral importance, the morally right act is that act
which conforms to the corresponding duty,
Quickly summarized, these are Ross's moral duties:

1)

To keep a promise, and to right one's wrongful acts; 2) To
return "services" given; 3)
according to merit; 4)

To distribute happiness

To benefit others where possible; 5)

To improve one;s self where possible; 6) To avoid injuring
others,16
There are often situations, Ross admits, where these
duties conflict,

Our actual duty cannot be determined until

all the circumstances have been determined.

In situations

where the Prima Facie duties conflict, our actual duty will
14

be that Prima Facie duty which is most important.

"Besides

the duty of fulfilling promises I have and recognize a duty
of relieving distress, and when I think it right to do the
latter at the cost of not doing the former it is ... because I
think it the duty which is in the circumstances more of a
duty.''17

The actual duty will always be a Prima Facie duty

for Ross, and it may override a different Prima Facie duty.
An act will be right for Ross if it conforms to the most
appropriate or important Prima Facie duty.
The fact that Ross's duties appear to him as selfevident does not mean that they will appear to a utilitarian
as self-evident.

Dr. Carson writes, "Mill and other

utilitarians do not think that it is self-evident that
[certain] acts are Prima Facie wrong."18

The usually

accepted definition of self-evidence indicates that truths
which are self-evident will be accepted without question by
virtue of their own powers.

The fact that reasonable

thinkers could disagree regarding the self-evidence of Prima
Facie duties indicates that they are only true insofar as
they are accepted by those who agree with Ross.

For this

reason, utilitarians argue, the truth of Prima Facie duties
is provided by their adherents, not by the duties themselves.
The type of acts Ross would claim to be self-evidently
Prima Facie wrong are acts which break those duties.

For

instance, for Ross it is Prima Facie wrong to break a
promise.

However, breaking a promise may be permitted if it

fulfills the Prima Facie duty to help others, and if it has
15

been determined that under a certain set of circumstances the
duty to help others is 'more of a duty' than is the duty to
keep a promise.

Even though breaking the promise is

permitted, for Ross breaking the promise is still Prima
Facie wrong.

For the utilitarian, though, if breaking the

promise serves the greater good, then breaking the promise is
right in all senses, not simply permitted.

Utilitarians

consider no acts right or wrong apart from their
consequences.

Until the consequences (probable or real) are

understood, the utilitarian reserves judgement on the act.
It seems to the utilitarian that in almost all
conceivable moral dilemmas, the duty to benefit others and
the duty not to harm others ought to carry the greater moral
weight.

The problem the utilitarian has with Ross in this

case is that Ross provides no real mechanism for ranking
duties in order of importance.

For the utilitarian, it is

not enough for Ross to simply say that, in a given situation,
the duty to help others is more important than the duty to
improve myself because ••• I think it is so.

What is to

prevent the Rossian from reversing himself in the next
situation, thinking the duty to improve himself 'more of a
duty'?

To rely on intuitions to solve disputes between other

intuitions is surely to invite moral inconsistency.
The utilitarian avoids this philosophical trap by
providing a mechanism to mediate between intuitions.
simply works to maximize the good.
for the utilitarian.

He

This is the end of ethics

Ross's deontology has no such end; it
16

is simply a mess of intuitions, none of which are any more
important than any other, save for the whims of the agent.
For Ross, however, utilitarianism can lead to absurd
actions in concrete situations.

In a situation where

breaking a promise would lead to a slight gain in happiness
or pleasure, the utilitarian would seem to be obligated to
break the promise.

If all the utilitarian is concerned with

is consequences, Ross might argue, utilitarianism destroys
the force of moral obligations all of us feel intuitively.
Taken to its logical extreme, Ross might claim,
utilitarianism could lead to a society in which moral rules
(other than those regarding consequences of actions) are not
observed.

If we could no longer trust our fellow man to keep

a promise, or obey any other moral rule, society itself would
suffer.
For Ross, the utilitarian is much too quick to break
moral rules.

If one were faced with a situation where lying

or breaking a promise would result in a slight increase in
the good, the utilitarian, Ross claims, must break the rule.
In a situation where lying would clearly result in a much
greater benefit to others, Ross could agree with a
utilitarian and admit that one ought to lie.

However, Ross

would refuse to admit that the lying itself was good.

The

utilitarian would claim that the lie was a part of an act
which resulted in a greater good, and was therefore right.
Ross will only admit lying when another duty clearly
overrides the obligation not to lie.

17

Because there is Prima

Facie obligation not to lie, Rossians will only lie in
extraordinary situations.

Because the utilitarian does not

seem to recognize the intuitive obligation not to lie, it
seems that he will lie in any situation where even the
slightest good will result.
A central objection, as I see it, that Ross would have
to utilitarianism here is that moral rules (except for the
rule that mandates maximizing happiness) mean nothing, and
have no hold on us.

The rules, or duties, Ross has explained

do seem to have a basis in our intuitions.

In our ordinary

life, most of us do seem to feel that lying is wrong.
Utilitarians, however, will seem to claim that in a situation
where lying results in any greater good, lying is right.
Utilitarianism seems to make the claim that our moral
intuitions, and the moral rules they have given birth to, are
meaningless.

For Ross, to deny the meaning and power of our

moral intuitions is to deny the ground of .morality itself.
Utilitarians would answer that the justification for our
moral intuitions is, in fact, utilitarian.

Utilitarians do

realize that a world in which no one can rely upon anyone
else to tell the truth would be a confused and dysfunctional
world.

In any situation where lying is an option,

utilitarians realize that the lie itself is bad for society
in general, and bad for the individual who lies.

The lie is

bad for society in that it weakens the trust we must have in
our fellow man to speak truthfully.

The lie is bad for the

individual because it can weaken the intuition we all do feel
18

against lying, and may lead to more lying in the future.
Therefore the utilitarian, like Ross, will only lie when it
is clear that a great good will result that will outweigh the
negative effects of the lie.
The utilitarian answer to the criticism that
utilitarians do not admit the power of moral rules is that
rules are, in fact, an important part of moral life.

R.M.

Hare, for instance, would claim that most of our moral
decisions can be made on an intuitive level, where rules
operate.

Act-utilitarians of all sorts will admit that it is

disadvantageous to make utilitarian calculations in every
moral situation.

Society as a whole will work better if

everyone conforms to a set of moral rules.

Only in special

cases, where rules conflict or do not clearly apply, does one
make calculations.

If utilitarianism demanded that one make

calculations every time one acted, and refused to acknowledge
moral rules, Ross' criticisms would be effective.
Utilitarianism does, however, realize the efficiency of moral
rules.
Also, it would be extremely awkward and time consuming
to be constantly calculating the consequences of one's
actions.

Most individuals simply do not have the time or the

ability to thoroughly evaluate the expected consequences of
each and every action.

Util(tarianism understands these

limitations, and requires that moral agents make calculations
only in special cases.
The ultimate purpose of this chapter of the thesis was
19

not to establish utilitarianism as the best sort of method
for solving moral disputes.

The purpose of this part of the

paper was to explain and defend the methodology that will be
used in my theory of just war, and its application to the
American war in Vietnam.
My theory of just war will, of course, be utilitarian,
but I will refrain from being limited to a certain version.
It is my belief that explaining and defending a specific
utilitarian theory will make this part of the theses entirely
too complicated.

In situations such as war, hopefully it is

clear what good consequences are (gaining freedom for a
people, keeping a people from oppression, etc.) and what are
bad consequences (being killed, having one's home destroyed,
etc.)

Any plausible theory of value will say these same

things.

It is not necessary to outline a specific theory of

value to justify that certain consequences of war are good
and that certain consequences are bad.
This theory of just war will keep in mind Smart's
distinction between the 'rational' action and the 'right'
action.

If the decision to wage war is on the available

evidence likely to secure the greatest good for the greatest
number, then fighting is rational.

For the war to be morally

right, that war must in fact have secured the greatest good
for the greatest number.
It must be acknowledged that a nation/group's objectives
can change during the course of a war.

It may well have been

right to fight for unconditional surrender at the start of a
20

conflict.

However, it may well also be wrong to prolong a

bloody conflict in search of that goal.

If the greatest good

will be served by changing the objectives for which a nation/
group fights during the conflict, the change ought to be
made,

And if the greatest good would be served by a nation/

group's quitting the fight at a particular point in time, the
nation/group ought to quit the fight at that time.
Therefore, during a war, it must be continually be asked if
prolonging the fight is rational.

If continuing the war from

a specific point in time (either in the same manner in which
it had been fought, or in an altered manner) is on the
available evidence likely to secure the greatest good for the
greatest number, then continuing the war is rational.
Likewise, if continuing the war from a specific point in time
(either in the same manner in which it had been fought, or in
an altered manner), did in fact secure the greatest good for
the greatest number, then continuing the war was right.
This theory of just war, then, has four separate but
closely related points:
1)

If the decision to waae war is, on the available

evidence, likely to secure the greatest good for the greatest
number, then waging war is rational.

Wars which do not meet

this condition are irrational.
2)

If wagina war did in fact secure the greatest

happiness for the greatest good, then waging war was right.
Wars which did not meet this condition were wrong.
3)

If continuing a war from a specific point in time

21

(either in the same manner in which it had been fought, or in
an altered manner) is on the available evidence likely to
secure the greatest good for the greatest number, then
continuing the war is rational.

Wars which do not meet this

condition are irrational.
4)

If continuing the war from a specific point in time

(either in the same manner in which it had been fought, or in
an altered manner) did in fact secure the greatest good for
the greatest number, then continuing the war was right.

Wars

which did not meet this condition were wrong.
It is clear that acts of war are always violent,
disruptive, and bloody.

It also seems clear that under any

plausible theory of value, destruction is of negative value.
When one's home has been destroyed in a bombing raid, or when
one has received third degree napalm burns, or even when the
population of one's quiet village has been subject to
execution, specific theories of value matter little.
simple fact of war is this:

The

war has a tendency to cause

damage to that which makes life worth living.
For utilitarians, the consequences that war forces on
both participant and civilian are of negative value.

For a

Rossian, a war such as our war in Vietnam clearly violates
his duty number six, which states that moral agents ought to
avoid injuring others.

Even for Kant, who stated the

categorical imperative, it is clear that a maxim which allows
the kind of destruction that was indiscriminately and
purposely rained on Vietnam is clearly not a maxim that one
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would will to be universal law.

Under all reasonable

theories of morality and value, the type of war we waged in
Vietnam has negative value.

To insist on a specific and

detailed theory of value in a just war theory is only to
confuse the issue.
People have a tendency to get killed, or have their
lives dislocated in horrible ways, in war.

As was made

painfully clear by our experience in Vietnam, it is not only
those who make war who are subject to this.
and often are victims of war.

Civilians can

It seems to be enough to say

that the destruction war causes to everyone involved is
obviously of negative value.

However, the simple fact that a

theory of just war is put forth implies that there could,
indeed, be a just war.

Such a war would be a war in which

the suffering was outweighed by the good gained.

Whether or

not a particular war was a just war, a war which was morally
right, can only be determined from the backwards looking
perspective.

If the war did, in fact, secure the greatest

good for the greatest number, the war was right and just.
The question now becomes, what is the nature of this good?
It is not the purpose of this paper to get caught up in a
lengthy metaethical debate, so it will hopefully be enough to
say that in this context, the good is that which makes life
worth living in the most basic sense.

Necessary conditions

for a life worth living might be existing without fear,
oppression, hunger, and being free to pursue happiness in all
its forms.
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Which methods ought to be used to pursue this good in
war?

Utilitarians will admit that it is not possible to

make utilitarian calculations in all situations where one
faces a moral choice.

In war, where combatants face

extremely stressful situations every day, it is simply not
possible to demand that utilitarian calculations be made
before every action.

The greatest good will be served by

admitting a series of rules which can be broken only in
exceptional situations.

Which rules of war, then, would

countries universally agree to, if they were rational,
impartial, and believed they might be involved in a war at
some time?

Richard Brandt points out that nations will

choose rules that maximize utility even if they are selfinterested, for they do not know ahead of time who will have
the advantage in a particular war, and would not wish to be
bound by a set of rules which favors the more powerful.19
Brandt points out also that nations will insist that these
rules do not impede their chances for victory in war.20
If we assume that nation/group 'X' was right in waging a
war, we also assume that their victory will result in the
greatest good for the greatest number.

The only individuals

capable of preventing 'X' from achieving the good are those
who fight or support the fight against them.

Civilians who

do not fight, and who are not· actively involved in supporting
the war effort against 'X' are not impediments to the goal of
'X'.

Intentional, direct, killing or injuring of these

civilians will do nothing to advance the good, and is
24

therefore wrong.
It is inevitable, however, that in war civilians will
die and be injured as a side-effect of operations designed to
help win the war and secure the good.

These bad effects are

permitted only if the chances for victory, and securing the
good, are great enough to outweigh the bad effects.

Brandt

writes, "Substantial destruction of lives and property of
enemy civilians is permissible only when there is good
evidence that it will significantly enhance the prospect of
victory."21
The methods used to secure the good in war must, then:
1)

Not allow the dt~ect, intentional killing or

injuring of civiliP-ns;
2)

Allow the indirect killing or injuring of civilians

only when it is clear that such an action will significantly
aid in securing victory and the good.
In war, these rules will be violated.

It is a simple,

unfortunate, fact of war that combat troops will kill or
injure those people who ought not be killed or injured.
Young men, trained to kill and injure, are not always able or
willing to distinguish those who ought to be killed and
injured from those who ought not.
of war.

This is one of the prices

One instance of a wrongful killing does not,

however, make an entire war unjust.
From a backwards looking perspective, if a war was
fought by a nation in such a way that the methods it used
caused so many innocent deaths and injuries that it became
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disproportionate to the good sought, that war was wrong.
From a forwards looking perspective, if a nation is causing
80

much harm to civilians that the destruction becomes

disproportionate to the good sought, then the methods ought
to be changed so as to find proportionality between
destruction and the good to be secured.

If this cannot be

done, any continuing waging of war is wrong.
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CHAPTER 3
AMERICA'S WAR IN VIETNAM

Charlie Company arrived at Landing Zone 'Dotti' on
January 26, 1968.

Their mission was no different from that

of other American combat units in Vietnam:
eliminate Viet Cong rebels.
in the art of killing.

to locate and

These men had been well trained

Their actions in the coming months,

specifically during Operation 'Muscatine', would prove just
how well the men of C Company had learned to kill.

However,

it would also indicate in a most graphic manner just how
chaotic and misguided the American war in Vietnam had become.
Army intelligence had advised Captain Ernest Medina,
leader of 'C' Company, that the entire 48th Viet Cong
Battalion complete with about 250 men had taken a position in
the hamlet of My Lai4.

(My Lai4 carries this number as it is

one of several numbered sub-hamlets within the larger Song-My
village.)

Medina's orders to Charlie Company were that the

48th Battalion was to be destroyed, as was My Lai4.

Many men

in 'C' Company thought that Medina had ordered them to kill
everyone in My Lai4.

"When we go in to My Lai, it's open

season," Medina reportedly said.22 On March 16, 1968, Charlie
Company was helicoptered into My Lai4 to begin 'Muscatine'.
Medina's orders had been accepted without question by his
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men,

The civilians of My Lai, knowing that anyone who ran

from American troops was considered Viet Cong, did not flee
Charlie Company.
their huts.

The Americans gathered the civilians from

As was the case throughout the incident, no one

in 'C' Company had been shot at or assaulted in any way.
Upon the orders of 2nd Lieutenant William Calley,
several civilians were herded into the center of the village,
According to Paul Meadlo, PFC, this came next:

"We stood 10

to 15 feet away and then Calley started shooting them.

I

started to shoot them."23 Hysterical villagers protested
their innocence, chanting "No VC!
had begun.
escape.

No VC!", but the slaughter

Several villagers panicked, and attempted to

PFC Dennis Conti recalled, "First we saw a few men

running ..• and then the next thing I knew we were shooting at
everything."24
Calley next ordered more civilians to the edge of a
ditch at the eastern edge of the hamlet.

Meadlo reported

that, "I guess I shot maybe 20 tb 25 people in the ditch •••
men, women and children.

And babies."25

By the time Charlie

Company had finished its duties at My Lai4, between 450 and
500 Vietnamese civilians were dead.

PFC Michael Benhardt

observed that, "We met no resistance and I saw only three
captured weapons.

We had no casualties ••.

I don't remember

seeing one military age male in the place."26
Perhaps the most telling comment on the My Lai massacre
came from Private Herbert Carter.

"The people didn't know

what they were dying for and the guys didn't know why they
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were shooting them."27 It may be possible to understand
Carter's quote in a wider context, indicative of a war gone
horribly wrong.
Just how and why the war was so wrong is one subject of
this part of the paper.

It is important to remember,

however, that doing what is wrong, and doing what is
irrational are different matters.

To repeat the distinction,

actions which are wrong are actions which, taken from a set
of alternative actions, did not have the best actual
consequences.

Actions which are irrational are actions which

are not, on the basis of the available evidence, likely to
secure the best consequences.

In Vietnam, America did wrong,

but I will argue that the irrationality of our actions was
not fully understandable until after the Tet Offensive.

If I

am right, it will become clear that after the Tet offensive,
not only was America doing the wrong thing in Vietnam, but it
was also acting irrationally.

Moral agents who know (or

ought to know) that their actions are irrational are
obligated to stop their actions.

America eventually did

leave Vietnam, but only after five more bloody years of war
after Tet.
The events preceding our involvement in Vietnam are
complex indeed, and it is not the purpose of this paper to
become immeshed in strictly historical issues.

However, a

rudimentary understanding of Vietnam's history, particularly
as influenced by French colonialism, is needed in order to
understand the whole of the Vietnam problem.
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Stanley Karnow, in Vietnam, A History, notes that as
early as the fifteenth century Europe had been pursuing
various interests in Asia.28

(At this time the country of

Vietnam occupied only the northern two-thirds of the area it
now occupies.

In the Fourteenth Century Champa existed to

Vietnam's southeast, and the Khmer Empire sat at its
southwest.

To the immediate west of Vietnam then were the

Thai and Laotian Kingdoms.)29

French missionaries and

entrepreneurs frequented Vietnam seeking to expand trade and
spread religious (Christian)

beliefs.

By 1787 the

Vietnamese had signed a treaty with the aggressive Frenchmen,
ceding territory to them, and giving the French exclusive
trading privileges.30

By 1887, following various Vietnamese

uprisings and rebellious action against French rule, the
French conquered Vietnam and set up the "Indochinese Union''.
All of modern day Vietnam, including Tonkin in the Northern
region, Annam, and Cochinchina in the South, as well as
Cambodia and Laos, were subject to French rule.31
In 1890, Nguyen Sihn Cung was born in the village of
Nghe An, in Central Vietnam.32

In the coming years, he was

to personify and lead the rebellion against the exploitive
and dominating French capitalists who ruled Vietnam.

Perhaps

the words of Paul Doumer, governor-general of Vietnam in
1902, sum up the French attitude towards the Vietnamese.
"When France arrived in Indochina, the Annamites were ripe
for servitude," he wrote.33

Against this uncaring and

repressive French colonial government, the 'Bringer of
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Light' rebelled.

Ho Chi Minh (Nguyen's pseudonym), the West

was to discover, would become both symbol and catalyst in a
determined struggle against any power challenging the unity
and sovereignty of his beloved homeland.

For Ho, there would

not be two wars, one against the French and one against the
Americans.

For him, the struggle was one protracted battle

against 'Western Imperialism'.

And he simply would not lose,

regardless of the damages he or his country might sustain.
On September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed Vietnam's
independence during a speech in Hanoi.

He borrowed from the

American Declaration of Independence in an attempt to seek
U.S. support for his cause.

But, as Woodrow Wilson had in

1919, the U.S. rejected his pleas.

Above all, Karnow notes,

Ho was a "pragmatist, principally preoccupied with Vietnam's
salvation."34

Ho's decision to turn to Communism for aid

in the struggle, after the American rejection, was partly a
commitment to the Communist ideal, and partly a pragmatic
decision.

Ho's studies in Paris with prominent leftists such

as Jules Raveau had served to push Ho towards socialist
ideals.35

America's rejections of his pleas for aid, and his

perception of Socialism as weak, served to convince Ho that
only the Communists, (namely, Soviets) had the power to help
ignite a revolution which would free Vietnam.36
In September of 1940, in a prelude to Japan's entry into
World War Two, the Japanese invaded and occupied much of
Indochina, leaving the French government in Vietnam intact.37
By March 9 of 1945, the Japanese had taken over the French
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administration in Vietnam.38

After the Japanese capitulation

in August of 1945, power in Vietnam was given over to a
provisional government in Hanoi, led by Ho Chi Minh and Bao
Dai.39

French authorities then regained control of their

colonies in Vietnam under British auspices.40

Ho's Vietminh

rebels refused to accept further control by Western powers,
and rebelled against the French, with a resurrection of armed
hostilities between the Vietminh and the French in late
1946.41
In 1945 the Japanese, cut off by Allied forces from food
supplies, stole the entire rice crop in Vietnam.

The result

was a horrible famine in which two million Vietnamese starved
to death.

The great suffering felt by Vietnam then boosted

nationalistic feelings to a fever pitch.

Following the

Japanese surrender in 1945, the Vietminh rebels attempted to
seize power.

Incredibly, the British then replaced the

oppressive Japanese government in Vietnam with the only
slightly less repressive French.

The Vietnamese Communists

under Ho Chi Minh were outraged, and were able to rally much
of the ravaged nation to fight for independence under
Communist banners.42
On September 24, 1946, Vietminh rebels attacked the
French-held Saigon airport and the local prison, where they
freed hundreds of comrades.

War had broken out in Indochina.

America supported France and their regime in Saigon, headed
by Bao Dai.

The Vietminh rebels, though, were well

supported, if not in money and hardware, but in spirit.
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"A

nationalistic culture, nearly xenophobic in intensity,
inspired in Vietminh activists the concept of a virtually
holy war against the foreign invaders and their native
clients."43

This intensity was to become manifest at

Dienbeinphu in 1954, where the French were ultimately
defeated.
The stage was set for Geneva, where the Communists would
sit with the Americans and the French.

For Americans, Geneva

marked the point in time where a South Vietnamese government
began to be organized; it was where the beginnings of South
Vietnamese independence were laid down.

For Ho and the

Communists, Geneva simply marked a lull in the struggle for
Vietnamese independence.
The agreement at Geneva in 1954 was not a political
agreement, in that it did not establish boundaries for, nor
did it establish the existence of, two separate Vietnams.
Although American officials would interpret the agreement
differently, the accords simply.called for an end to the
battles.

"The only documents signed were cease-fire accords

ending the hostilities."44
the 17th parallel.

The country would be divided at

French forces would withdraw from north

of that line, and the Vietminh would withdraw from the south.
In the summer of 1956, nationwide elections would be held,
whereby the nation would be reunified.

The U.S., clinging to

its fears of an international Communist conspiracy, agreed
reluctantly, but Saigon, led by Ngo Dinh Diem, did not,
fearing Communist victory.

The U.S. would come to back Diem,
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and support his claims to independence.
Anti-communist sentiments ran high in the U.S. then, and
our government was not prepared to capitulate to any
agreement that might have resulted in a Communist takeover of
Vietnam.

Unfortunately, "the Communists, who had fought to

unify Vietnam, would not accept the prospect of permanent
partition", as Diem and the U.S. wanted.45
By 1955, then, the U.S. had begun to directly fund the
Saigon government.
its army.

We also had begun to train and advise

By 1957, Communist insurgency had started again in

South Vietnam, and by 1959 North Vietnam had begun to move
weapons and military advisors of their own into the South via
the Ho Chi Minh trail.

By 1962 the U.S. had 12,000 military

advisors in Vietnam.
In 1964 the Tonkin Gulf incident occurred, in which an
American Navy destroyer may have been attacked by North
Vietnamese patrol boats in the northern South China Sea.

A

congressional resolution sparked by the incident allowed
President Johnson to finally intervene in Vietnam without
going through the arduous process of declaring war.

the U.S. had committed ground troops to Vietnam.

By 1965

This

commitment was both the culmination of a long historical
process, and the beginning of a tragedy of mammoth
proportions.
The first goal of this paper is to argue that, among
several alternative courses of action available to it during
the Vietnam War, America failed to choose the one which had
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the best consequences.
as a whole was wrong.

For this reason, our war in Vietnam
Five representative course of action

available to America which I will analyze are these:
1)

Not to fight, or provide aid to South Vietnam in any

2)

To become involved in the Vietnam slowly, through a

way.

process of gradual escalation.

(This, of course, was the

alternative America chose.)
3)

To fight as hard and as aggressively as was

politically possible from the start of our involvement,
sending up to 200,000 men to Vietnam in 1963, and merciless
bombing of North Vietnam through out the war.
4)

To send an even larger ground force into Vietnam,

using much less air and artillery power, sustaining heavy
American casualties, causing less civilian casualties, while
fighting a strictly guerilla type of war.
5)

To drop nuclear bombs on North Vietnam, and Viet

Cong strongholds in South Vietnam.46
The course of action America chose was, of course,
gradual escalation.

lt is possible to speculate on what the

consequences might have been had America chosen alternatives
3, 4, or 5, and I will do so later.
I will begin by examining some of the real consequences
which arose from America's actions in the Vietnam War.
It must be remembered that America lost this war, and
the Communists did take over Vietnam.

Had we chosen not to

fight, the Communists still would have taken over Vietnam.
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This would have happened without eight years of war with the
Americans, however.
Much has been made of the issue of South Vietnam's
legitimacy as a state following the Geneva Conference of
1954.

Whether South Vietnam was a legitimate state under

attack by foreign aggression or an illegitimate regime
propped up by Western interests is not relevant (for
utilitarians) for the purposes of this paper.
this paper is morality, not legality.

The issue in

All arguments

centering around international law and international
agreements are therefore not pertinent.

Whether it was a

civil war between the North and the South of Vietnam, or a
case of over-the-border aggression, one thing is clear.
was war.

It

And America chose to involve itself in that war.47

It is indisputable that America's involvement in the
Vietnam war, understood in its entirety, failed to secure the
greatest good for the greatest number, compared to the
alternative of not fighting.

If we had not intervened in

that war, the Communists would have taken over the whole of
the country, perhaps in two to three years.

(It took the

Communists about this long to take over Vietnam after America
withdrew in 1973.
quickly.

Perhaps it would have happened more

By 1973 America's actions had weakened the

Communist fighting capacity somewhat, which may have delayed
their eventual takeover of the entire country.)

As it turned

out, our actions failed to prevent a Communist takeover of
Vietnam.

Our actions did, however, add greatly to the pain
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and suffering that country experienced.
cost the lives of some 56,000 Americans.
level, then, our actions were wrong.

Our actions also
On this simplest

(The other alternatives

I have suggested and their probable consequences can and will
be explored.)
The issue demands further explanation, however.

Exactly

how did our actions contribute to this great suffering?
The Communist mind-set in that war was one of steely
determination.

They simply would not allow their country to

remain severed by foreign powers.

Vietminh rebels who fought

the French at Dienbienphu were of the same mold as the
Vietcong rebels who would later battle American troops in
South Vietnam.

Ho Chi Minh claimed, "You can kill ten of my

men for every one I kill of yours.
you will lose and I will win."48

But even at those odds,
It was a failure of U.S.

policy not to recognize that the national will of the
Communists was uncompromisable.
Because of this unshakeable will, and because the
Communist resistance chose to fight the war by hiding
themselves amongst a civilian population, America was forced
to use extreme measures to wage war in Vietnam.

My argument

here is that our methods of fighting did, in fact, allow the
killing of civilians, many times when it was most decidedly
not clear that such actions would have significantly
increased the chances for victory.

The problem was that all

the evidence points to the fact that the U.S. waged this war
in a manner that did not separate, or distinguish between,
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combatants and noncombatants.

According to Jean-Paul Sartre,

we had by 1968 begun a systematic destruction of the
Vietnamese people.

"The declaration of America's statesmen

are not as candid as Hitler's were ...

'Declare you are

beaten or we will bomb you back to the stone age ... '
[the U.S.] have said:
genocide'.49

They

'genocide yes, but conditional

Sartre's point is that one cannot force

surrender upon a force as determined, and as entrenched
within a civilian population, as the Communists were. In
order to defeat such a force, the only option is to destroy
both civilian and combatant.

Consciously or not, we were

involved in a systematic slaughter of the Vietnamese people.
In the South, the choice is the following:
villages
burned, massive bombing, livestock $hot, vegetation
destroyed by defoliants, crops ruined by toxic aerosols,
and everywhere indiscriminate shooting, murder, rape, and
looting. This is genocide in its strictest sense:
massive extermination, ••
Is it any different for the
North? ••• Not just the daily risk of death, but the
systematic destruction of the economic base of the
country .•. of hospitals, schools, places. of worship •••
Deliberate attacks against civilians.SO
Sartre's arguments are emotionally powerful.

And they

are based solidly in fact.
Journalist Jonathan Schell recounts the BENTON bombing
operation carried out against supposed Vietcong hideouts in
the Quang Ngai province in 1967.

An area of several square

kilometers was targeted, wherein the VC supposedly had taken
refuge.

The area had been declared a 'free-fire zone', which

meant that anyone in it was fair game for our bombers,
artillery, and ground troops.

Schell recounts, "I flew fo~
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two weeks with the forward air control planes, and what I saw
day by day was the bombing of the villages and their burning
by combat troops."51

In the end, "an area inhabited by

17,000 people was about 70 percent destroyed with no
warning."52
The most infamous case of civilian deaths in Vietnam
was, of course, My Lai.
one such incident.

Unfortunately, there was more than

Robert Lifton notes, "No soldier I have

talked to has been surprised at the news of My Lai ...

They

have either been party to, or witness to similar or smaller
incidents."53

My Lai became a symbol for American policy, it

seems, because of the face-to-face interaction of murderer
and victim.

More destructive than any ground operation could

have been, however, was the rain of fire American bombers and
artillery dropped on that country.

Indiscriminate bombing

runs, and the policy of free-fire zones, violated the
generally accepted principle of noncombatant immunity
flagrantly, dislocating scores of civilians, and producing
countless refugees.
The problem for our military was that it was sometimes
impossible to distinguish the enemy from the civilian
population.

The harder it became for our soldiers to find

the enemy, the more villages we destroyed, and the more bombs
we dropped.

Unfortunately, "1hese approaches are

intrinsically utterly indiscriminate- they strike entire
populations ••• virtually an entire people is America's
enemy."54.
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The policy that seems to have been the least
discriminating and the most destructive was that of the
'free-fire zone'.

Inside a free-fire zone any and all

Vietnamese are assumed to be the enemy.

Civilians are then

subject to bombing, artillery strikes, and sometimes
relentless ground assaults in which any hut or house not
destroyed by the bombs or artillery might be burned to the
ground.

"A free-fire zone is an area in which, by official

declaration, there are no friendly forces or populace and in
which targets may be attacked on the initiative of U.S.
commanders ••.

Since everybody is an enemy, everyone and

everything becomes a target."55

To get at VC who live and

hide amongst peasants, it was official if undeclared policy
to kill all the peasants, if need be, to uncover the enemy.
Warning leaflets were sometimes dropped into the villages
prior to the assault, describing the bombing that would occur
if the civilians continued to allow VC to reside there.

It

was not explained in the leaflets how unarmed peasants were
to deny armed rebels access to their villages.
A larger problem with American policy in free-fire zones
was that in at least half the cases, camps of VC were
mislocated, or VC were not there when the bombs fell on the
peasants.56

In free-fire zones, as well as in other

indiscriminate bombing missions, the relation between policy
and reality blurred badly.

Huts were bombed, and then

classified as "military targets destroyed", and areas were
targeted for bombing on little more than cursory inspections
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of areas from 5,000 feet in the air.57

Regardless of

official protestations to the contrary, there was little, if
any, effort on the part of those participating in the bombing
and shelling of villages to distinguish combatant from
noncombatant.
It would be impossible to ignore our use of chemical
warfare in Vietnam.

In particular, the use of napalm and

herbicides was destructive to noncombatants.

"Napalm, a

highly incendiary fluid that clings, has the capacity to maim
permanently and induce slow death ••• its use in Vietnam has
involved many civilian and peasant families."58

In the case

of such a destructive and horrifying weapon, special care
ought to have been taken to keep it away from civilian
populations.

It cannot be argued, even from the standpoint

of military necessity, that it was right to drop napalm on
noncombatants.

If the only way to keep our troops in Vietnam

safe was to drop napalm, artillery, and bombs
indiscriminately on civilians, while at the same time using
more than one hundred million pounds of herbicide to destroy
the natural environment (59), we ought not to have been in
Vietnam at all.
The attitude of a U.S. Army Captain describes fairly
well the disdain Americans had for Vietnamese civilians, and
the reluctance of American troops to even attempt to sort
enemy from peasant.

"One Captain was asked how he knew a man

he had just shot running out of a hut was a VC, said, 'Son, I
know he's a VC by the nine bullet holes in his chest'.60
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A

U.S. Special Forces estimate concluded that we were killing
or wounding ten civilians for every VC.61
American policy, I conclude, failed miserably to
distinguish combatant from noncombatant.

"Translated into

human terms, the U.S. has made South Vietnam a sea of fire as
a matter of policy, turning an entire nation into a target,"
62

It is not my intention to indict the footsoldier or the

bomber pilot.

It is, however, my intention to indict the

military system and policy that manufactured him.

Our

military leadership as a whole is responsible for its failed,
destructive policy.
It is undeniable that the individual must take a certain
amount of responsibility for his actions, but it is not
possible to burden him with full responsibility.

It was the

system that trained him to kill, and it was the system that
taught him to follow orders without question, it was the
system that put him in Vietnam, and most importantly it was
the system that had made explicit the policy that refused to
distinguish combatant from noncombatant.

It was American

leadership, then, from the President on down to military
policy makers, who failed to separate civilian from enemy in
Vietnam.

In no way was the senseless manner in which the

U.S. waged war in Vietnam right under the principle of noncombatant immunity.
The senselessness to which Schell (and others) refer, it
seems, is the impossibility of defeating an enemy who, 1)
refuses to be beaten, and, 2) hides himself among a civilian
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population.

By fighting the way we were fighting, I do not

think such an enemy can be defeated without utterly
destroying him and those around him.

However, fighting a

true guerilla war would have meant increasing the amount of
our ground troops greatly, and reducing the amount of our
protective firepower, which would have resulted in a much
higher rate of American casualties.

Politically, it does not

seem that America was willing to accept these higher demands
in order to fight in such a way as to confront a guerrilla
force on its own terms.

As a result of our reluctance to

accept these demands, we were left with the above
difficulties.
Was the cost to America and Vietnam worth the strugale?
We accomplished nothing in Vietnam.

We did, however,

"shatter Vietnam's economy, disrupt its social texture, and
exhaust its population in both the North and the South."63
About ten percent of the entire Vietnamese population, more
than 4 million soldiers and civilians, were killed in the
war.64

America lost over 50,000 men.

It is clear that our

war in Vietnam did not achieve the greatest good for the
greatest number, compared to the option of not fighting at
all.
There were alternative courses of action America might
have chosen to pursue in the Vietnam war.

Alternative #3, to

fight as hard and aggressively as possible from the start of
our involvement, sending 200,000 men to Vietnam in 1963,
merciless bombing of North Vietnam throughout the war, was
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and

one of these other options.

Understanding that the following

is mere speculation, what might have happened if we had taken
this course of action?
It is important to remember that America's entry into
the Vietnam war began slowly, with small amounts of troops
and military advisors.

In 1963, when Kennedy was

assassinated, America had only 16,263 military advisors in
South Vietnam.65

Various advisors to Kennedy, including

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, indicated to Kennedy
that a quick and large build-up of American forces in Vietnam
would bring the crisis to an end.

Kennedy was advised that

as many as 200,000 troops would need to be immediately
deployed, and that air strikes against North Vietnam would
need to be launched, in order to control the situation.
McNamara was convinced that "maximum U.S. forces required on
the ground in Southeast Asia will not exceed ••• 205,000
men."66

These advisors were convinced that Kennedy was,

"trying to accomplish a very large objective ••• on the
cheap."67
Unfortunately, the approach Kennedy's advisors expounded
ignored two important factors:

the limits of air power, and

the very nature of the struggle in Vietnam.
In a struggle mostly fought by guerilla forces, air
power will not succeed in destroying an enemy's will or
ability to fight.

America never understood this simple fact.

"President Johnson believed that carefully controlled bombing
would ultimately compel Hanoi to end the war by making it too
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costly."68

Others in that administration, like National

Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and Secretary of State Dean
Rusk were convinced that bombing would "break Hanoi's will to
fight".69
It does not appear that American air power had such
capabilities.

Viet Cong rebels needed only a small amount of

material to fight.

"No amount of bombing could stop a meager

amount [of materials] from reaching the South."70

For that

reason, destroying the population centers of the North, or
its agricultural system, would not have had a great effect on
the war in the South.71

Even if American air power had

succeeded in halting Hanoi's support of the VC, it was not
certain that the VC would have stopped fighting.

"The

cessation of Northern support was no guarantee that Saigon
could survive against the Viet Cong."72
The failure of America to understand the limits of its
air power indicated a failure to understand the very nature
of the war itself.

For Norman Podhoretz, even a large and

immediate American entrance into the Vietnam war would not
have been effective.

"Yet even if Kennedy had taken [his

advisors] advice and gone in fast as well as big, the chances
are that the result would have been futility."73

Faced with

a guerilla war, America had prepared for and attempted to
fight a massive conventional war.

Initially, America

attempted to prepare the South Vietnamese Army for a
conventional over-the-border invasion by the Communists, not
realizing that the bulk of the war in its early stages was to
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be fought by local resistance.

Later, when America entered

the war, "The Army chose not to adapt to the unique
environment of Vietnam, instead conducting big-unit
operations against bands of guerillas, and relying too
heavily on technology and the lavish use of firepower."74
Given the reality of these two grievous
misunderstandings by the United States, it seems that a more
aggressive entrance and posture in Vietnam would not have
assured victory.

"In short, it seems reasonable to conclude

that the only way the U.S. could have avoided defeat in·
Vietnam was by staying out of the war altogether."75

It also

seems reasonable to conclude that such an aggressive option
would only have resulted in more death and destruction than
did the option we chose, and the end result, a Communist
takeover of Vietnam, would not have changed.

Most probably,

this option would not have achieved the greatest good for the
greatest number compared with the other options I have
listed.
The final option I have listed is the option of extreme
aggression.

We could have chosen to drop nuclear bombs on

North Vietnam and on VC strongholds in South Vietnam.

This

option would simply have eliminated anyone in Vietnam who
stood in the way of American goals.

This option would

clearly have caused more harm than any other option.

We

would have literally destroyed most of the country of
Vietnam, killed many more civilians than we actually did, and
we may well have scared or angered Russia enough to start
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World War III.

For these reasons, this course of action was

not considered a real option by America.

I examine the

option only as a logical possibility.
There, then, are five representative options America
faced in the Vietnam war.

They range from the option of not

fighting at all to the option of extreme aggression.

A

Communist takeover of Vietnam was inevitable, given the
Communist will, the Communist method of fighting (which
America could never understand or deal effectively with), and
our own military limitations.

Therefore, the option which

would have kept the pain and suffering in that situation to a
minimum was the option of not fighting.

America failed to

choose this option, and therefore acted wrongly by fighting a
war in Vietnam.
Likewise, the methods America used to wage war in
Vietnam tended to allow the killing or injuring of civilians
when it was not clear that such actions would have
significantly aided in securing victory and the good.

The

indiscriminately destructive nature of military actions such
as in My Lai, or free-fire zones, resulted in unnecessary
civilian deaths.

For this reason, as well as the others I

have outlined, our war in Vietnam was wrong.
Given the situation America was faced with in 1960,
however, our decision to fight in Vietnam can be said to be
at least rational.

However, given the situation America was

faced with in 1968, our decision to continue to fight cannot
be said to be rational.

Just why this is so is the subject
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of the final portion of this paper.76
As I mentioned previously, J.J.C. Smart has explained
the difference between that which is right and that which is
rational.

I would argue that, in the evaluation of an

historical action, the distinction hinges on the perspective
in time from which one views the action.

If one is at a

point in time where several courses of action are being
considered, it is not possible, strictly speaking, to know
which action will be the 'right' one.

All it is possible to

do from that perspective is to choose that alternative which
is, on the available evidence, likely to produce the best
results.

After the action is completed, it is possible to

judge the real consequences of the actions, and thereby judge
the rightness or wrongness of the action.

The terms

"rational" and "irrational" are to be used "to appraise
[actions] on account of their likely successes."77

I would

argue that our initial decision to wage war in Vietnam was a
rational decision.

In order to· show that this decision was

truly rational, two points must be demonstrated.

The first

point is that the goals we sought in that war did at the time
seem most likely to represent the greatest good for the
greatest number.

The second point is that, at the time, it

could have been reasonably concluded that we would succeed in
obtaining those goals in an armed conflict.

(If it could not

have been reasonably concluded that we would succeed in
Vietnam, then deciding to fight there was a decision that
could only be reasonably expected to raise the body count,·
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contribute nothing towards obtaining the good, and would
therefore be irrational.)
Proving conclusively that Democracy is a better
political system than Communism is remains the task of
political scientists.

However, I think it is safe to say

that, given the economic failure and oppressive nature of
Communism in the world today, Democracy is the method of
government which has the better chance of affording the
citizens of a given country a prosperous and good life.
While the notion of a 'Communist conspiracy' to take
over much of the world seems ridiculous to us in 1990, this
notion did not seem so far-fetched in the years after World
War Two.

"By 1947 there were alarming signs that the Soviet

Union had no intention of surrendering control over the
countries of Eastern Europe •..

Further, the Soviets were

employing local Communist parties to subvert non-Communist
countries like Greece and Turkey."78

A policy of

'containment' was developed by the Truman administration,
indicating that, "It must be the policy of the U.S. to
support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation
by •••

outside pressures."79

The North Atlantic Treaty

Organization was formed to resist Soviet efforts to claim
more of Europe.

In 1950, the United States went to war in

Korea, extending the principles of containment to Asia; we
left little doubt that America would indeed use military
force to stop the spread of Communism.SO

There was, then, a

policy in place to support a defence of South Vietnam, and a
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precedent in which America had demonstrated her willingness
to use force to support that policy.
Given that American intervention in Korea resulted in
keeping that country from falling completely to Communism,

and given the relative prosperity of South Korea, it could be
said that our intervention there did, in fact, secure the

best consequences.

If American intervention in Korea, where

Communist aggression was halted, secured the good, it can be
argued that America could have also logically expected to
secure the good in fighting Communism in Vietnam.
Kennedy argued that America had a real interest in
protecting South Vietnam from Communism.

If Saigon fell to

the Communists, "Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the
Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia ••• would be
threatened."81

This infamous 'domino' theory, which held

that losing South Vietnam would leave many other countries
vulnerable to a Communist takeover, is not held in high
regard today.

From Kennedy's perspective, however, given

Communist aggression in Eastern Europe and China, and what
was to happen in 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis, the
threat of a Communist offensive throughout Southeast Asia
must have seemed very real.

Ultimately, Kennedy argued, if

we did not squarely face this threat in Southeast Asia, "The
United States, inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and
take up our defenses on our own shores."82

It seems

reasonable that, given the aggressive activities of
Communists worldwide from the period immediately after World
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War Two up to the time when America finally committed ground
troops to Vietnam in 1965, America would come to feel (during
that same period of time) that the stability of the nonCommunist world, and, by logical extension, its own future,
was at stake.

Given that situation, I would argue that the

only rational decision would have been to oppose Communism in
Southeast Asia.
If we did not do so, some thought, would that not signal
to the Communists that they had free reign to overtake
various countries at will?

''Vietnam represented a test of

American responsibility and determination."83

How could

America claim to be on the side of the right and the good if
it permitted those who were on the side of evil to overrun
South Vietnam?

How could the nations of the free-world

depend on America if it turned its back on South Vietnam?
America concluded, rationally it seems, that if it were going
to truly represent and stand for the good, it must stand
squarely against that which was not good.
There could be no argument that those who threatened
South Vietnam were Communistd.

"The Vietminh rebels [who

fought the French, and who would later evolve into the
Vietcong) were certainly Communists and they were clearly
tied to the international Communist movement.

Their leader,

Ho Chi Minh, had actually founded the Communist party of
Vietnam, he had been trained in Moscow, and his forces were
now being supplied by the mainland Chinese."84

And,

immediately after the French had been defeated at
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Dienbienphu, America could claim that Saigon was no longer
tainted by Western colonialism.

"There was now an indigenous

non-Communist government in South Vietnam."85
America was faced with a situation it could not turn
away from.

The only remaining question was, could we expect

to achieve our goals through armed conflict in Vietnam?

This

is a most difficult question to answer, in that the true
scope of the problem in Vietnam did not present itself
immediately.

There was never a time, in the early 1960's,

where it was obvious that America was committing itself to
eight years of brutal war.

If we had know in 1962 what we

know in 1990, that the Vietnamese rebellion was incredibly
well-organized, unbelievably determined to win, extremely
hard to locate in an utterly foreign terrain, and very easily
supplied, perhaps our decision to fight would have been
different.

As it was, we only learned these things as we

fought our way through the jungles of Vietnam.

The question

remains, could we have learned these things before we decided
to fight?

I do not think so.

We did, in fact, attempt to learn about the Vietnamese
and the nature of the struggle there.
No conflict in history was studied in as much detail as
it was being waged. Officials from nearly every
Washington agency would conduct surveys in Vietnam •••
They included weapons technicians, economists,
sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists,
biologists, chemists, and public opinion pollsters. They
investigated the effects of defoliants, the impact of
bombs, the efficiency of cannon. They scoured villages
and interviewed peasants. They interrogated enemy
defectors and prisoners. They pored over captured
Communist documents ••• 86
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But even with all this study, no answers to the
Vietnamese problem was found.

It seems reasonable to

conclude that, if America could not answer these questions
during the war, after it had been exposed to the situation,
it would have been impossible to answer these questions
before the war, before we had been exposed to the situation.
What we did know in the early 1960's was that Communism
was threatening South Vietnam, and that South Vietnam needed
America's military assistance.

This we gave, in small

amounts at first, but in increasing amounts as the problem
came to be seen as increasingly larger.

We gave this

assistance in part because we were certain we were on the
side of the good, and in part because we were confident we
would succeed.

Unfortunately, we were confident we would

succeed because we failed to understand exactly what would be
required for America to win in Vietnam.

What makes our

confidence at the time reasonable, howeve~, was-that it was
impossible to understand that winning was impossible until we
were involved in a full-scale war.87
Given the historical/political conditions which made
Vietnam a war we could not turn away from, and our reasonable
confidence that we would be successful there, I would
conclude that America's decision to wage war in Vietnam was
rational.

This does not mean that this decision was right.

My point is only that, given the available evidence in the
early 1960's, America did choose that action which could
reasonably have been expected to reap the best consequences.
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However, in deciding to continue to wage war after the
Tet Offensive in early 1968, America did not choose that
action which could have been expected to give the best
consequences.

The Tet Offensive began on January 29, 1968,

and was concluded March 31, 1968.

The Offensive was an

organized Communist assault on the cities and military
strongholds of South

Vietnam. It was designed both to

overwhelm the anti-Communist forces in South Vietnam and
stimulate a general uprising by the people of South Vietnam
in favor of the Communist cause.
militarily.

It was a bold move

Never before in this war had the Communists

attempted an attack of this nature or scale.

"The People's

Liberation Armed Forces and elements of the Vietnam People's
Army had gathered for synchronized assaults on cities, towns
and military headquarters throughout South Vietnam.

For

years they had been men of the jungle, daring in boast and
banner but cautious in the commitment of major military
assets.

Now they would emerge everywhere."88

The Communist hope was that during the celebration of
Tet, the Vietnamese lunar New Year's celebration, their enemy
would be unprepared for attack.

They hoped to stretch the

American and South Vietnamese defences to the breaking point,
and they hoped to ruin the government of South Vietnam in the
process.89

The Communists had committed nearly 70,000 troops

to the Offensive, almost one-quarter of their entire force.90
In these objectives the Communists failed.

"In many

places, they were swiftly crushed by overwhelming American
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and South Vietnamese military power."91

The battle for the

Mekong River delta in southernmost Vietnam, and the battle
for Hue' in the North of South Vietnam, illustrate the nature
of the Offensive.

In the Mekong delta, the South Vietnamese

defences proved poorly prepared for the Viet Cong assault.
"There was no alarm, in many cities, until enemy troops began
firing in the middle of town."92

South Vietnamese officers

balked under the intense pressure of the Communist attack; in
one delta province an American adviser found the province
chief wearing a set of civilian clothes under his military
uniform in order to facilitate a quick getaway.93

Finally,

American firepower was able to secure the delta area, but the
Viet Cong attack had made a clear point, even though, as was
the case with the entire Tet Offensive, the Communists failed
to hold any territory.
The Viet Cong, though, were well-organized, more so than
the Americans had thought, and they were frighteningly driven
to achieve victory.

The Army of South Vietnam, however,

revealed themselves to be less than heroic.

"For a fleeting

instant, some of the hidden realities of Vietnam were
illustrated •••
fanaticis •-

These included the determination and

heroism, one might say- of the Viet Cong officers

and men, and the failure of will and nerve of a number of
South Vietnamese officers."94

Indeed, the Viet Cong had lost

in the Mekong delta, but their Offensive had demonstrated an
unexpected tenacity, and it had shown just how unprepared
this part of South Vietnam was to defend itself.
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The battle for Hue' was a tremendous struggle, easily
worthy of its own chapter in a military history of Vietnam.
I will try to explain the highlights of this battle in a
brief manner.

"The twenty-five day struggle for Hue' was the

longest and bloodiest ground action of the Tet Offensive and,
quite possibly, the longest and bloodiest single action of
the war."95

On the night of January 31, 1968, two North

Vietnamese battalions mixed with Viet Cong forces began their
attack on Hue'.
Among their targets were the military airstrip, an
ammunition warehouse, a police station, and the U.S. military
advisor's compound.96

Some of the heaviest fighting occurred

in the walled Citadel, a holy place within Hue' where relics
of ancient Emperors and ancestors were held.

The fighting in

and out of the Citadel was brutal house-to-house combat, with
Americans rooting out the Communist troops occupying the
city.

Marine troops fighting northward from the Military

Advisors Compound were able to gain only four blocks in seven
days, during which they sustained heavy casualties.97
Progress in the Citadel was slower still.

It was clear that

Communist forces in Hue' were fighting with the same fierce
resolve that their comrades in the Mekong delta had
displayed.

Furious attacks on American positions in Hue'

continued until the sheer number and power of American and
South Vietnamese forces were able to overtake the final
Communist strongholds in Hue':
suburban Gia Hoi area.

the Citadel itself and the

By February 24, these strongholds had
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been cleared.98
The damage to Hue' itself was extensive.

Nearly 80%

buildings in the city itself had been destroyed or damaged by
artillery.99

The brutality of the Communist forces became

apparent when a mass grave containing 2800 bodies was found;
the bodies were those of Southern Vietnamese government
personnel.100
As was the case in the Mekong delta, extraordinary
actions by American troops managed to take back what
territory the Communists had gained.

(It must be admitted

that, though, in Hue' the 1st South Vietnamese Division's
elite 'Black Panther' Company distinguished itself in the
fighting.101)

The heretofore unseen courage and

determination of the Communist forces surprised the American
and South Vietnamese forces, as did the ability of the
Communists to organize and carry off such a massive
operation.
It must be remembered, however, that the Tet Offensive
was a military loss for the Communists.

The Offensive had

failed to scatter the enemy, it had failed to stimulate a
popular uprising, it had, in the end, failed to win the war.
"Where was the glorious victory?

What happened to the

seething revolutionary masses •• ?

Where were the legions of

puppet troops who were ready to turn their guns around and
join the revolution?
tunnel?"102

Where was the light at the end of the

The end of the war was not yet in sight; the

Communists, who had thought victory was within their grasp,
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must have known then that the struggle would be longer than
anyone had imagined.

But they would not give in.

As Don

Oberdorfer reported, "No hard information is available on the
state of mind of the .••

Vietnamese Communist movement."103

It is not possible to know the extent of Communist morale
after Tet.

It is possible to know this, however:

not quit the struggle.

they did

After a crushing military defeat, a

defeat which was from the Communist point of view was
supposed to have been a glorious victory, a defeat in which
the Communists lost perhaps 40,000 men (104), they kept
fighting just as hard as they had before.
From the American point of view, what did all this mean?
First, it was clear that, while the Communists were not
winning the war, neither were we.

"The Communist attacks on

the cities of South Vietnam show that we don't have the
country under any kind of control and that we are in a much
worse position than we were in two years ago,"
Eugene McCarthy.105

claimed

When General Westmoreland asked America

to send an additional 206,000 troops to Vietnam on March 9,
1968, claims that we were winning the war seemed to take on
even less credibility.

"If so many Communists were killed

and their Army routed, why were 206,000 more Americans
required?

If this 206,000 were dispatched to war, what

assurance was there that another group of 206,000 would not
be needed then, and another after that?

Was there no end to

this bottomless pit •. ?"106
What should have been clear to the American government
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by April of 1968 was that we were not going to win that war.
It should have been clear by then that our best efforts were
not injuring the will of the Communists.

It should have been

clear by then that our massive air force was not effective
against an enemy who had little or no industrial targets.

As

a young American fighter pilot reported to a group of White
House aids in February of 1968, "We were going through the
worst fucking flak in the history of man, and for what- to
knock out some twelve foot wooden bridge they can build back
a couple hours later?"l07

All these things should have been

clear to the American government after the Tet Offensive,
but, judging from the fact that the last American combat
troops did not leave Vietnam until March 29, 1973, apparently
these things were not clear.

Nixon's foggy notion of

achieving a 'peace with honor' only served to prolong an
already bloody war.

By April of 1968, it was not reasonable

to believe that the Vietnam war was winnable.
If a war is not winnable, and the good is not
achievable, prolonging hostilities simply adds more death and
destruction to an already grim scene.

As I see it, our

options at this point were these:
1) Stop fighting and withdraw immediately.
2) Withdraw slowly, maintaining an active combat
presence, while attempting to give the responsibility
for victory to the South Vietnamese.
3) Increase our efforts greatly.
The rational alternative in any situation is the one
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which holds the most promise, given the evidence an agent has
about that situation, to have the best consequences.

The

best consequences may be those in which the good is
maximized, or the best consequences may be those in which the
bad is minimized.

In the case of Vietnam, since it was clear

that we were not going to achieve what we had determined at
the time to be the good, the best consequences would be those
in which the bad was kept to a minimum.

Also, it must be

pointed out, alternative three was not possible.

By spring

of 1968, due in part to the political reverberations of the
Tet Offensive, a large segment of the American public had
lost its patience with the war in Vietnam.

It is extremely

doubtful that public opinion would have allowed any increase
in troop number past the 540,000 troops we had in Vietnam at
the end of 1968.108

Therefore, this final question remains,

was the rational decision in 1968 to keep fighting, while
withdrawing slowly and attempting to turn the war over to the
South Vietnamese, or was the rational decision to withdraw
immediately?
The question here is not whether or not our continuing
the war after the Tet Offensive was right or wrong.
issue has already been decided.

That

As I have explained earlier,

our entire war in Vietnam was wrong.

It must be noted,

however, that even under our strategy of gradual withdrawal,
we did an extreme amount of damage to Vietnam after the Tet
Offensive.

Edward Herman reported, "The continued use of

American air and artillery power in the cities of Vietnam
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since the Tet Offensive has created more refugees, destroyed
more allied property, and killed more civiiians in the urban
area than all the VC rocket and mortar attacks during the
entire war."109

(Underlining mine.)

It seems clear, then,

that continuing to wage war after the Tet Offensive was wrong
because it failed to achieve the greatest good for the
greatest number.

But was the decision to continue to wage

war after Tet rational, i.e., was the decision on the
available evidence likely to secure the greatest good for the
greatest number?
Let us examine one of the key goals of our slow
withdrawal strategy, Vietnamization.

Under this strategy,

the war was to be turned over slowly to the South Vietnamese.
Two points are relevant here.

The South Vietnamese had never

been tested in major operations without American help.

Also,

the reason America was involved in that war in the first
place was that South Vietnam had desperately needed our
military assistance in the early 1960's.

There was no

evidence to suggest that the South Vietnamese Army was
capable of winning the war without significant American aid
in 1969 or at any time thereafter.

A failed South Vietnamese

excursion into Cambodia and Laos in 1970 that was intended to
destroy parts of the Ho Chi Minh trail demonstrated that, in
fact, South Vietnam was incapable of fighting without
American aid.110
Vietnamization was doomed to failure because the South
Vietnamese Army, with the exception of a few elite units, was
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simply not competent enough nor enthusiastic enough to defeat
the Communists.

After nearly ten years fighting alongside

them, American officials must have been aware of the military
deficiencies of the South Vietnamese.
If, as it seemed clear after the Tet Offensive, the war
in Vietnam was not going to be won by American efforts, or by
South Vietnamese efforts, or by and combination thereof, the
only rational decision would have been to stop fighting.
Difficult and depressing as it may have been to simply give
up, to abandon South Vietnam to a Communist takeover,
continuing to fight was clearly an option that would have
(and, in fact, did) have worse consequences.

Both America

and Vietnam were subjected to five years of unnecessary war
because of our decision to continue to fight after the Tet
Offensive.

What makes the decision to keep fighting after

Tet irrational is that we should have known by then that the
war was unwinnable.

Our failure to understand this simple

fact made the period of war from mid 1968 to 1973 not only
wrong but irrational.
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